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Abstract—How can we release a massive volume of sensitive
data while mitigating privacy risks? Privacy-preserving data
synthesis enables the data holder to outsource analytical tasks
to an untrusted third party. The state-of-the-art approach for
this problem is to build a generative model under differential
privacy, which offers a rigorous privacy guarantee. However, the
existing method cannot adequately handle high dimensional data.
In particular, when the input dataset contains a large number of
features, the existing techniques require injecting a prohibitive
amount of noise to satisfy differential privacy, which results in
the outsourced data analysis meaningless. To address the above
issue, this paper proposes privacy-preserving phased generative
model (P3GM), which is a differentially private generative model
for releasing such sensitive data. P3GM employs the two-phase
learning process to make it robust against the noise, and to
increase learning efficiency (e.g., easy to converge). We give
theoretical analyses about the learning complexity and privacy
loss in P3GM. We further experimentally evaluate our proposed
method and demonstrate that P3GM significantly outperforms
existing solutions. Compared with the state-of-the-art methods,
our generated samples look fewer noises and closer to the
original data in terms of data diversity. Besides, in several data
mining tasks with synthesized data, our model outperforms the
competitors in terms of accuracy.
Index Terms—differential privacy, variational autoencoder,
generative model, privacy preserving data synthesis
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of private data release, including privacy-
preserving data publishing (PPDP) [30] [40] and privacy-
preserving data synthesis (PPDS) [4] [6] [25] [45], has become
increasingly important in recent years. We often encounter
situations where a data holder wishes to outsource analytical
tasks to the data scientists in a third party, and even in a different
division in the same office, without revealing private, sensitive
information. This outsourced data analysis raises privacy issues
that the details of the private datasets, such as information about
the census, health data, and financial records, are revealed to
an untrusted third-party. Due to the growth of data science and
smart devices, high dimensional, complex data related to an
individual, such as face images for authentications and daily
location traces, have been collected. In each example, there
are many potential usages, privacy risks, and adversaries.
For the PPDP, a traditional approach is to ensure k-anonymity
[40]. There are lots of anonymization algorithms for various
data domains [3] [15] [30]. However, k-anonymity does not
take into account adversaries’ background knowledge.
∗ Equal contribution. § A main part of the author’s work was done while
staying at LINE Corporation.
Fig. 1: Privacy-preserving data synthesis via sharing a decoder
of a differentially private generative model.
For releasing private statistical aggregates, differential pri-
vacy (DP in short) is known as the golden standard privacy
notion [17]. Differential privacy seeks a rigorous privacy
guarantee, without making restrictive assumptions about the
adversary. Informally, this model requires that what can be
learned from the released data is approximately the same,
whether or not any particular individual was included in the
input database. Differential privacy is used in broad domains
and applications [6] [10] [35]. The importance of DP can be
seen from the fact that US census announced ’2020 Census
results will be protected using differential privacy, the new
gold standard in data privacy protection’ [2] [9].
Differentially private data synthesis (DPDS) builds a gen-
erative model satisfying DP to produce privacy-preserving
synthetic data from the sensitive data. It has been well-studied
in the literature [4] [11] [25] [43] [45] [46]. DPDS protects
privacy by sharing a differentially private generative model to
the third party, instead of the raw datasets (Figure 1). In recent
years, NIST held a competition in which contestants proposed
a mechanism for DPDS while maintaining a datasets utility
for analysis [34].
To preserve utility in data mining and machine learning
tasks, a generative model should have the following properties:
1) data generated by the generative model follows actual data
distribution; and 2) it can generate high dimensional data.
However, the existing DPDS algorithms are insufficient for
high dimensional data. When the input dataset contains a large
number of features, the existing techniques require injecting a
prohibitive amount of noise to satisfy DP. This issue results in
the outsourced data analysis meaningless.
We now explain the existing models and their issues
summarized in Table I. DPDS has been studied in the past
ten years. Traditional approaches are based on capturing
probabilistic models, low rank structure, and learning statistical
characteristics from original sensitive database [11] [45] [46].
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(a) MNIST (original) (b) VAE [27] (c) DP-VAE (VAE w/ DP-SGD) (d) DP-GM [4] (e) Proposed Method
Fig. 2: Sampled images from (b) VAE [27], (c) DP-VAE, (d) DP-GM [4] and (e) proposed method P3GM. These four models
are trained with (a) MNIST. (b), (c) and (d) satisfies (1, 10−5)-differential privacy. Comparing the images sampled from DP-VAE
and DP-GM, P3GM generates finer and more diverse samples. P3GM generates images that are visually closer to (a) and (b).
TABLE I: Contrast with competitors. Only the proposed method achieves all requirements in PPDS for high dimensional data.
PrivBayes [45] VAE with DP-SGD DP-GM [4] P3GM (ours)
PPDS under differential privacy X X X X
Generate diverse samples X X
Capacity for high dimensional data X X
PrivBayes [45] is a generative model that constructs a Bayesian
network with DP guarantee. However, since PrivBayes only
constructs the Bayesian network among a few attributes, it is
not suitable for high dimensional data.
Deep generative models have been significantly improved in
the past few years. According to the advancement, constructing
deep generative models under differential privacy is also a
promising direction. We have two distinguished generative
models: generative adversarial nets (GAN) [21] and variational
autoencoder (VAE) [26] [27].
GANs can generate high quality data by optimizing a
minimax objective. However, it is well known that samples from
GANs do not fully capture the diversity of the true distribution
due to mode collapse. Furthermore, GANs are challenging to
evaluate, and require a lot of iterations to converge. Therefore,
under differential privacy, such learning processes tend to inject
a vast amount of noise. Actually, existing GAN based models
with DP have significant limitations. DP-GAN [43] needs to
construct a generative model for each digit on MNIST, to avoid
the lack of diversity due to mode collapse. In [25], PATE-GAN
demonstrated its effectiveness only for low-dimensional table
data having tens of attributes.
In contrast, VAEs do not suffer from the problems of mode
collapse and lack of diversity seen in GANs. However, recently
proposed VAEs under DP constraints are not sufficient. A
simple extension of VAE to satisfy DP is employing DP-SGD
[1], which injects noise on stochastic gradients. However, it
also produces noisy samples (see Figure 2c). It is due to that
the learning process of VAE is also complicated. DP-GM [4]
proposed a differentially private model based on VAE. DP-
GM employs a simplified process that first partitions data
by k-means clustering and then trains disjoint VAEs for each
partition. As a result, DP-GM can craft samples with less noise,
but these samples are close to the centroids of the clusters.
This means DP-GM causes mode collapse accompanied by
breaking the diversity of samples so that it can generate clear
samples (see Figure 2d). In other words, the generated data
does not follow the actual distribution of data, which causes
low performance for data mining tasks. For example, DP-GM
generates clear images in Figure 2d, but the accuracy of a
classifier trained with the generated images results in 0.49. In
this paper, we study a differentially private generative model
that generates diverse samples; the generated data follows the
actual distribution.
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a new generative model that
satisfies DP, named privacy preserved phased generative model
(P3GM). Using this model, we can publish the generated data
in a way which meets the following requirements:
• Privacy of each data holder is protected with DP.
• The original data can be high dimensional.
• The generated data approximates the actual distribution
of original data well enough to preserve utility for data
mining tasks.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no techniques to achieve
acceptable utility under the above requirements with  ≤ 1 in
DP. Because of the above properties, we can use P3GM for
sharing a dataset with sensitive data to untrusted third-party
such as a data scientist to analyze the data while preserving
privacy.
The novelty of our paper is the new generative model with
two-phased training. P3GM is based on VAE, which has an
expressive power of various distributions for high dimensional
data. However, P3GM has more tolerance to the noise for
DP than VAE. Our training model is the encode-decoder
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model same as VAE, but the training procedure separates
the VAE’s end-to-end training into two phases: training the
encoder and training the decoder with the fixed encoder, which
increases the robustness against the noise for DP. Training of the
decoder becomes stable because of the fixed encoder. We define
objective functions for each training to maximize the likelihood
of our model. We show that if the optimal value is given in
the training of the encoder, the decoder has the possibility to
generate data that follows the actual distribution. Moreover,
we theoretically describe why our two-phased training works
better than end-to-end training under DP.
Furthermore, we give a realization of P3GM and a theoretical
analysis of its privacy guarantee. To show that generated
data preserve utility for data mining tasks, we conduct
classification tasks using data generated by the above example
with real-world datasets. Our model outperforms state-of-the-
art techniques [4], [45] concerning the performances of the
classifications under the same privacy protection level.
B. Preview of Results
Figure 2 shows generated samples from (b) VAE [27], (c)
VAE [27] with DP-SGD [1] (we call DP-VAE), (d) DP-GM
[4], and (e) our proposed method P3GM. All methods are
trained from (a) the MNIST dataset, and (c), (d) and (e) satisfy
(1, 10−5)-DP. Behind the non-private method (b), samples from
DP-VAE (c) look very noisy. Samples from DP-GM (d) are
very fine, but it generates less diverse samples for each digit.
Our proposed method (e) shows less noise and well diverse
samples than (c) and (d). P3GM can generate images that are
visually close to original data (a) and samples from the non-
private model (b). Detailed empirical evaluations with several
data mining tasks are provided in the latter part of this paper.
C. Related Works
Private data release. For releasing private statistical ag-
gregates of curated database, differential privacy is used for
privatization mechanisms. Traditionally, releasing count data
(i.e., histograms) has been studied very well [13] [29] [39]
[44]. To release statistical outputs described by complex queries,
several works addressed differentially private indexing [38]
and query processing [5] [28] [31]. By utilizing these querying
systems tailored to DP, we can outsource data science to third
parties. However, on these systems, data analysts are forced to
understand their limitations. Our approach enables the analysts
to generate data and use them freely as well as regular data
analytical tasks.
Private data collection. Local differential privacy (LDP)
[16] has been established as a strong privacy standard for
collecting users’ sensitive information into an (untrusted) server.
Several companies utilize LDP for collecting their users’ data
privately [18]. To collect users’ data for a variety of tasks,
several works proposed mechanisms that satisfy LDP [7] [22]
[41] . These methods under LDP aim to collect distributed data,
but we address the problem under central DP that is to release a
statistical output of collected data, particular generative model
into third parties.
TABLE II: Table of Symbols.
Symbol Definition
x, z A variable of data and a latent variable.
X = {x(i)}Ni=1 A dataset where x is a data record and
N is the number of data records.
pθ(x) A marginal distribution of x parametrized by θ.
pθ(z) A marginal distribution of z parametrized by θ.
pθ(x|z) A posterior distribution that we refer to as
decoder parametrized by θ
θ∗ The actual parameter of the generative model
which generates the dataset.
qφ(z|x) An approximate distribution of pθ(x|z)
parametrized by φ. We refer to this as encoder.
µφ(x), σφ(x) The mean and the variance of qφ(z|x).
x˜ A variable generated by a generative model.
α The order of ren´yi differential privacy.
f A function of dimensionality reduction.
pfθ (z) A distribution of f(x) where x follows pθ(x)
rλ(z) A distribution which approximates pfθ∗(z)
parameterized by λ.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly describe essential backgrounds
to understand our proposals. First, we explain variational
autoencoder (VAE), which is the base of our model. Second,
we describe differential privacy (DP), which gives a rigorous
privacy guarantee. Finally, we introduce three techniques
that we use in our proposed model: differentially private
mechanisms for expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm,
principal component analysis (PCA), and stochastic gradient
descent (SGD).
Table II summerizes notations used in this paper.
A. Variational Autoencoder
Variational autoencoder (VAE) [27] assumes a latent variable
z in the generative model of x. In VAE, we maxmize the
marginal log-likelihood of the given dataset X = {x(i)}Ni=1.
Variational Evidence Lower Bound. Introduction of an
approximation qφ(z|x) of posterior pθ(z|x) enable us to
construct variational evidence lower bound (ELBO) on log-
likelihood log pθ(x) as
LELBO(x) = log pθ(x)−DKL(qφ(z|x)||pθ(x|z))
= Eqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x|z)]−DKL(qφ(z|x)||pθ(z))
≤ log pθ(x).
(1)
qφ(z|x) and pθ(z|x) are implemented using a neural network
and LELBO can be differentiable under a certain assumption so
that we can optimize LELBO with an optimization algorithm
such as SGD.
Reparametrization Trick. To implement qφ(z|x) and
pθ(z|x) as a neural network, we need to backpropagate through
random sampling. However, such backpropagation does not
flow through the random samples. To overcome this issue,
VAE introduces the reparametrization trick for a sampling
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of a random variable z following N (µ, σ). The trick can be
described as:
z = µ+ σ;  ∼ N (0, I).
Random sampling. The generative process of VAE is as
follows:
1) Choose a latent vector z. z ∼ N (0, I)
2) Generate x˜ by decoding z. x˜ ∼ pθ(x|z).
B. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) [17] is a rigorous mathematical
privacy definition, which quantitatively evaluates the degree of
privacy protection when we publish outputs. The definition of
DP is as follows:
Definition 1 ((ε, δ)-differential privacy): A randomized
mechanism M : D → Z satisfies (ε, δ)-DP if, for any two
input D,D′ ∈ D such that dH(D,D′) = 1 and any subset of
outputs Z ⊆ Z , it holds that
Pr[M(D) ∈ Z] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[M(D′) ∈ Z] + δ.
where dH(D,D′) is the hamming distance between D,D′.
Practically, we employ a randomized mechanism M that
ensures DP for a function m. The mechanism M perturbs
the output of m to cover m’s sensitivity that is the maximum
degree of change over any pairs of dataset D and D′.
Definition 2 (Sensitivity): The sensitivity of a function m
for any two input D,D′ ∈ D such that dH(D,D′) = 1 is:
∆m = sup
D,D′∈D
‖m(D)−m(D′)‖.
where || · || is a norm function defined on m’s output domain.
Based on the sensitivity of m, we design the degree of noise to
ensure differential privacy. Laplace mechanism and Gaussian
mechanism are well-known as standard approaches.
C. Compositions of Differential Privacy
Let M1,M2, . . . ,Mk be mechanisms satisfying ε1-, ε2-
, . . . , εk-DP, respectively. Then, a mechanism sequentially
applying M1,M2 . . . ,Mk satisfies (
∑
i∈[k] εi)-DP. This fact
refers to composability [17].
The sequential composition is not a tight solution to compute
privacy loss. However, searching its exact solution is #P-hard
[33]. Therefore, Discovering some lower bound of accounted
privacy loss is an important problem for DP. zCDP [8] and
moments accountant (MA) [1] are one of tight composition
methods which give some lower bound.
Re´nyi Differential Privacy (RDP) also gives a tighter analysis
of compositions for differentially private mechanisms [32].
Definition 3: A randomized mechanism M : D → Z
satisfies (α, ε)-RDP if, for any two input D,D′ ∈ D such
that dH(D,D′) = 1, and the order α > 1, it holds that
1
α− 1 logEz∼M(D′)
(
Pr(M(D) = z)
Pr(M(D′) = z)
)α
≤ ε. (2)
The compositions under RDP is known to be smaller than the
sequential compositions. For RDP, the following composition
theorem holds [32]:
Theorem 1 (composition theorem of RDP): If randomized
mechanisms M1 and M2 satisfy (α, ε1)-RDP and (α, ε2)-
RDP, respectively, the combination of M1 and M2 satisfies
(α, ε1 + ε2)-RDP.
Further, between RDP and DP, the following theorem holds
[32]:
Theorem 2 (relation between RDP and DP): If a randomized
mechanism M satisfies (α, ε)-RDP, for any α > 1, 0 < δ < 1,
M satisfies (ε+ log 1/δα−1 ,δ)-DP.
We can see that RDP is implicitly based on the notion of MA
from the following theorem [42].
Theorem 3 (relation between RDP and MA): In the notion
of MA, the αth moment of a mechanism M is defined as
follows [1]:
MAM(α) := max
D,D′
logEz∼M(D) exp
(
α log
Pr(M(D) = z)
Pr(M(D′) = z)
)
Then, the mechanism M satisfies (α+ 1,MAM(α)/α)-RDP.
D. Differentially Private Mechanisms
Here we introduce several existing techniques used in
our proposed method. We explain DP-EM [36] and privacy
preserving PCA [24] and DP-SGD [1].
DP-EM: Mixture of Gaussian. DP-EM [36] is the
expectation-maximization algorithm satisfying differential pri-
vacy. DP-EM is a very general privacy-preserving EM algorithm
which can be used for any model with a complete-data likeli-
hood in the exponential family. They introduced the Gaussian
mechanism in the M step so that the inferred parameters satisfy
differential privacy. We assume that p(x) follows mixture
of Gaussian p(x;pi,µ,Σ) = ΣKk=1pikN (xi;µk,Σk), where
ΣKk=1pik = 1 and K is the number of Gaussians, and we use DP-
EM algorithm to estimate parameters of it while guaranteeing
differential privacy. Let {pi,µ,Σ} = {pik, µk,Σk}Kk=1 denote
the parameters. Then, the M step, where parameters are updated,
is as follows.
p˜i = pi+ (Y1, ..., YK); Σ˜k = Σk +Z; µ˜k = µk + (Y1, ..., Yd)
where pi,Σk and µk are derived with the maximum likelihood
estimation in its iteration. Y and Z are the Gaussian noise for
differential privacy. The noise is scaled with the sensitivity of
their parameters. By adding this noise, each iteration satisfies
(εi, δi)-DP. When the sensitivity is 11, the upper bound of αth
moment of DP-EM of each step is as follows [36]:
MADP-EM(α) ≤ (2K + 1)(α2 + α)/(2σ2e) (3)
where σe is the parameter which decides the scale of the noise.
Privacy preserving PCA. Privacy-preserving principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) [24] is the mechanism for the PCA
with differential privacy. The method follows the Wishart
mechanism, which needs less noise than simple differentially
1We can guarantee that the sensitivity is less than 1 by using a technique
called clipping which is described at DP-SGD in Section II-D
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private PCA under the same privacy guarantee. Privacy-
preserving PCA satisfies (ε, 0)-differential privacy by adding
noise to the covariance matrix A as follows:
Aˆ = A+W ; W ∼Wd(d+ 1, Cw)
where Wd is the Wishart distribution, d is the dimension of data
and Cw is a matrix which has d same eigenvalues equal to 32nε .
Computing Aˆ satisfies (ε, 0)-DP, so the principal component
analysis using Aˆ satisfies (ε, 0)-differential privacy2. In this
paper, DP-PCA denotes privacy-preserving PCA. Since DP-
PCA satisfies εp-DP, DP-PCA satisfies (α, 2αε2p)-RDP from
Lemma 1 in [32].
DP-SGD. Differentially private stochastic gradient descent
[1], well known as DP-SGD, is a useful optimization technique
for training various models, including deep neural networks
under differential privacy. SGD iteratively updates parameters
of the model θ to minimize empirical loss function L(θ). At
each step, we compute the gradient gx = ∇θL(θ, x) for a
subset of examples which is called a batch. However, the
sensitivity of gradients is infinity, so to limit the gradient’s
sensitivity, DP-SGD employs the gradient clipping ψC defined
as follow:
ψC(g) = g ∗min
(
1,
C
‖g‖2
)
This gradient clipping limits the sensitivity of the gradient as
bounded up to C. Based on the clipped gradients, DP-SGD
crafts a randomized gradient g˜ through computing the average
over the clipped gradients and adding noise whose scale is
defined by C and σs, where σs is noise scaler to satisfy (ε, δ)-
DP.
g˜ =
1
B
∑
b∈[B]
ψC(gb) +N (0, σ2sC2I)
 .
where B is the batch size and [B] denotes the batch of
the dataset. At last, DP-SGD takes a step based on the
randomized gradient g˜. DP-SGD iterates this operation until
the convergence, or the privacy budget is exhausted.
Abadi et al. [1] also introduced moment accountant (MA)
to compute privacy composition tightly. The upper bound of
the αth moment of DP-SGD of each step is proved by Abadi
et al. [1] as follows:
MADP-SGD(α) ≤ s
2α(α− 1)
(1− s)σ2s
+
λ+1∑
t=3
{ (2s)
t(t− 1)!!
2(1− s)t−1σts
+
st
(1− s)tσ2ts
+
(2s)t exp ((t2 − t)/2σ2s)(σts(t− 1)!! + tt)
2(1− s)t−1σ2ts
}
(4)
where !! represents the double factorial and s is a sampling
probability: the probability that a batch of DP-SGD includes
one certain data. In this paper, we assume that a batch is made
by uniformly sampling each data, and the batch is uniformly
chosen, so s is B/N .
2We note that since the mean of overall training inputs is required for
the dimensionality reduction of PCA, we assume that it is publicly available
for simplicity. The mean can be differentially private if we employ some
mechanisms like clipping its norm.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider dataset X = {x(i)}Ni=1 consisting of N i.i.d.
samples of some continuous or discrete variable x. We assume
that the distribution of the data x is parameterized by some
parameter θ; each data x is sampled from pθ∗(x) where
θ∗ is the parameter which generates the dataset. Since the
actual parameter θ∗ includes information of the dataset X,
we publish the parameter θ∗ instead of the dataset for privacy
protection. However, the actual parameter is hidden, so we need
to train the parameter using the dataset. Moreover, this trained
parameter includes private information; an adversary may infer
the individual record from the trained parameter. Then, in this
paper, we consider the way of training the parameter θ with
DP.
Auto-Encoding Variational Bayes (AEVB) [27] algorithm
is a general algorithm for training a generative model that
assumes a latent variable z in the generative process. In this
algorithm, a distribution qφ(z|x) which approximates pθ(z|x)
is introduced to derive LELBO (Equation (1)), and parameters
φ and θ are iteratively updated by an optimization method
such as stochostic gradient descent (SGD) to minimize LELBO.
VAE is one of the models that use neural networks for qφ(z|x)
and pθ(x|z) and becoming one of the most popular generative
models to its versatility and expressive power. Then, the naive
approach, which we call DP-VAE, for our problem described
above is to publish θ of VAE trained by the AEVB algorithm
with DP-SGD as the optimization method. Although DP-VAE
satisfies DP, we empirically found that θ trained by DP-VAE
was not enough for an alternative of the original dataset, as
shown in Figure 2(c). This is because the objective function of
VAE (Equation (1)) is too vulnerable to the noise of DP-SGD
to train θ. Therefore, we introduce a new model tolerable to
the noise, which we call Privacy-Preserving Phased Generative
Model (P3GM).
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
We here propose a new model, named phased generative
model (PGM), and we call its differentially private version
privacy-preserved PGM (P3GM). PGM has theoretically
weaker expressive power than VAE but has a tolerance to
the noise for DP-SGD.
Section IV-A gives an overview of PGM. In Section IV-B
and IV-C, we describe each phase of our two-phase training,
respectively. In Section IV-D, we introduce an example of
P3GM. Section IV-E gives us how to sample synthetic data
from P3GM. In Section IV-F, we give the proof of privacy
guarantee of the example of P3GM by introducing the tighter
method of the composition of DP.
A. Overview
The generative model of PGM follows the same process
as of VAE; first, latent variable z is generated from prior
distribution pθ(z). Second, data x is generated from posterior
distribution pθ(x|z). Then, we introduce an approximation
qφ(z|x) of pθ(z|x) to derive LELBO (Equation (1)), which
enables maximization of the likelihood of the given dataset. We
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Fig. 3: Model architectures of VAE and P3GM.
will refer to qφ(z|x) as a probabilistic encoder because qφ(z|x)
produces the distribution over the space of z given data x. In a
similar vein, we will refer to pθ(x|z) as a probabilistic decoder
because pθ(x|z) produces the distribution over the space of
x given a latent variable z. In this paper, we assume that the
encoder and the decoder produce a Gaussian distribution for the
reparametrization trick and the tractability. The main difference
is in its training process shown in Figure 3 comparing with VAE.
PGM separates the training process into two phases: Encoding
Phase and Decoding Phase. In PGM, we assume a distribution
for pθ(z) different from VAE to fix a part of parameters trained
in Decoding Phase. Through Encoding Phase, we can partially
fix the encoder used in Decoding Phase. Then, we train the
other parameters with the fixed encoder following the AEVB
algorithm in Decoding Phase. The fixed encoder makes the
AEVB algorithm stable even if we replace SGD with DP-
SGD. This stability is the advantage of our two-phased training
model.
B. Encoding Phase
Through Encoding Phase, a part of parameters, concretely,
µφ(x) = E[qφ(z|x)], becomes fixed. In other words, Encoding
Phase partially fixes the encoder. Here, we explain how to fix
the parameter before Decoding Phase.
The encoder’s purpose is to encode original data to the latent
space so that the decoder can decode the encoded data to the
original data. Another purpose of the encoder is to encode the
data to a latent variable that follows some distribution so that
the decoder can learn to decode the latent variable. Therefore,
we can fix the encoder by finding an encoder achieving these
two purposes.
First, we describe the ideal but unrealistic assumption to
make it easy to understand PGM. The assumption is that the
encoder encodes the data to the same data, which means that
the encoded data is following pθ∗(x). Since the encoded data
includes the same information as the original data and follows
pθ∗(x), this encoder satisfies the above two purposes. Thus,
we can fix the encoder as this. Then, we train the decoder
using the fixed encoder in Decoding Phase while assuming
that the latent variable is following pθ∗(x). In other words, we
assume that pθ(z) is identical to pθ∗(x). We note that when the
decoder is pθ(x = x|z = x) = 1, it holds that pθ(x) = pθ∗(x).
This means that sampling z from pθ∗(x) and decoding z to x
with the decoder pθ(x|z), we can generate data which follows
the actual distribution pθ∗(x).
However, since θ∗ is not observed and is intractable, we
cannot estimate θ∗, encode to pθ∗(x), and sample z from
pθ∗(x). Therefore, we approximate pθ∗(x) by some tractable
distribution to enable estimation, encoding, and sampling.
However, due to the curse of dimensionality, it is hard to
infer the parameter for high dimensional data that we want to
tackle. Then, to solve this issue, we introduce a dimensionality
reduction f : Rd → Rd′ where d and d′ are original and
reduced dimensionality, respectively. We let pfθ (z) denote
the distribution of z = f(x) where x follows pθ(x). Then,
rλ(z) denotes the approximation of p
f
θ∗(z) by some tractable
distribution such as mixture of Gaussian (MoG). We fix the
encoder to encode x to data which follows rλ(z) by estimating
the parameter λ.
As described above, the encoder’s purpose is to encode the
data so that the decoder can decode the encoded data to the
original data. From this purpose, the objective function for
dimensionality reduction f can be defined as follows:
min
f,g
Ex∼pθ∗ (x)[‖x− g(f(x))‖22] (5)
where g represents a reconstruction function of f . Intuitively,
if there is a function g where this value is small, data encoded
by f has the potential to be decoded to the original data.
Conversely, if this is large, the decoder will not be able to
decode the encoded data to the original data.
In this model, we assume the following equation.
E[pθ∗(z|x = x)] = f (x) (6)
Intuitively, this assumption means that PGM assumes that data
x is generated from data which dimensionality is reduced by f ,
i.e., f(x). This assumption enables the fixing of the encoder
as µφ(x) = f (x), because qφ(z|x) is the approximation of
pθ(z|x). Here, the encoder encodes the original data to the
data which follows rλ(z) instead of p
f
θ∗(z). Therefore, the
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objective function to obtain the optimal λ can be defined as
follows:
min
λ
DKL(p
f
θ∗(z)||rλ(z)) (7)
where DKL represents the KullbackLeibler divergence. We
consider the ideal case where there are a dimensionality
reduction f , a reconstruction function g and approximation
rλ(z), which satisfies that Equation (5) and Equation (7) are 0.
In this case, if the decoder can emulate g (e.g., above example)
by training, it holds that pθ(x) = pθ∗(x), which means that
the PGM generates data which follows the actual distribution
pθ∗(x).
We note that the variance σφ(x) of the decoder qφ(z|x) is not
fixed in Decoding Phase, which means that we simultaneously
train a part of the encoder for the encoder to approximate
pθ∗(z|x).
The dimensionality reduction and estimation of λ cause
privacy leak. However, by guaranteeing DP for each component,
PGM satisfies DP from the composition theorem (we refer to
Section II-C).
C. Decoding Phase
We optimize the rest of the parameters of the encoder and the
decoder following the AEVB algorithm. Here, we explain how
to optimize the parameters. LELBO on log-liklihood log pθ(x),
which was explained in Section II-A, is approximated by a
technique of Monte Carlo estimates.
LELBO(x) ≈
1
L
L∑
l=1
log pθ(x = x|z = zi,l)−DKL(qφ(z |x = x)‖pθ(z ))
(8)
where L is the number of iterations for Monte Carlo estimates
and zi,l is sampled from qφ(z|x) using the reparametrization
trick (we refer to Section II-A). If LELBO is differentiable, we
can optimize parameters w.r.t. LELBO using SGD. The first term
is differentiable when we assume that pθ(x|z) is a Bernoulli or
Gaussian MLP depending on the type of data we are modeling.
Since we assume that pθ(z) is identical to rλ(z), we need
to choose a model for rλ(z) which makes the second term
differentiable.
D. Example of P3GM
We introduce a concrete realization of the privacy-preserved
version of PGM, i.e., P3GM. Same as VAE, P3GM uses neural
networks for pθ(x|z) and qφ(z|x). The neural networks output
the mean and variance of the distributions.
Encoding Phase: We first describe how to estimate λ in a
differentially private way. First, we need to decide the model of
the prior distribution rλ(z). The requirements are as follows:
1) The second term of Equation (8) can be analytically
calculated and is differentiable.
2) The objective function (7) is small enough to approxi-
mately express the true distribution pfθ∗(z).
3) We can estimate λ with DP.
Although a suitable choice of the model depends on the data
type (requirement 2), in this paper, we use the general model
for an example: a mixture of Gaussians (MoG). That is,
rλ(z) = MoG(z;λ)
When we approximate the expectation in the KL term of
Equation (7) by the average of all given data, we can formulate
the objective function as follows:
max
λ
ΠNi=1rλ(f(x
(i)))
This is the same as the objective function of the maximum
likelihood estimation, so we can use EM-algorithm for the
estimation of the parameter of MoG. Further, EM-algorithm
can satisfy DP by adding Gaussian noise (requirement 3), which
we introduced as DP-EM [36] in Section II-D.
KL divergence between two mixture of Gaussian
g(pia, µa, σa) and h(pib, µb, σb) can be approximated as fol-
lows [23]:
DKL(g|h) ≈∑
a
pia log
Σa′pia′ exp (−DKL(N (µa′ , σa′)‖N (µa, σa)))
Σbpib exp (−DKL(N (µa, σa)‖N (µb, σb)))
Therefore, we can analytically calculate the second term of (8)
using this approximation (requirement 1).
In a dimensionality reduction, we aim to minimize the
objective function (5) with DP. We approximate it by the
average of all given data.
N∑
xi
1
N
‖xi − g(f(xi))‖22
When f is a linear transformation which is useful for DP, this
is optimized by PCA. As described in Section II, PCA can
satisfy DP (DP-PCA). Therefore, we introduce DP-PCA as a
dimensionality reduction.
Decoding Phase: As described above, since the LELBO is
differentiable, we can optimize parameters with DP-SGD. We
show the pseudocode for P3GM in Algorithm 1. We refer
to the detail of DP-SGD in Section II-D. In Algorithm 1, all
parameters θ and φ are packed into θ, for simplicity.
E. Data Synthesis using P3GM
The data synthesis of our model follows the two steps below:
1) Choose a latent vector z. z ∼MoG(z;λ)
2) Generate x˜ by decoding z. x˜ ∼ pθ(x|z).
It is worth noting that since MoG approximates the distribution
of real data, we can generate data in a similar mixing ratio of
real data. Also, we can attach the label to synthetic data by
training P3GM with one-hot-encoding of the label. By utilizing
our model, we can share privatized data by releasing the model
that satisfies DP. Due to the post-processing properties of DP,
sampled data from the model with random seeds do not violate
DP.
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Algorithm 1: P3GM
Input: x1, . . . ,xN ∈ X, µX
Output: The model parameters θT , the parameter of
MoG λ
Parameter : reduced dimension d′, privacy parameters in
PCA, EM and SGD εp, σe, σs, learning rate
ηt, batch size B, gradient norm bound C
1 Σ ← DP-PCA(x1, . . . ,xN ;d′, εp)
2 xˆ1, . . . , xˆN ← dimensional reduction(X,Σ,µX)
3 λ ← DP-EM(xˆ1, . . . , xˆN ;σe)
4 pθ(z)← MoG(z;λ)
5 for t ∈ [T ] do
6 Take a random batch Bt w/ sampling probability B/N
7 Compute gradient
8 For each (xb, xˆb) ∈ [Bt] compute
gt(xb, xˆb)← ∇θtLELBO(θt,xb, xˆb, λ)
9 Add noise and descent
10 g˜t ← 1B (
∑
b∈[Bt] ψC(gt(xb, xˆb)) +N (0, σ2sC2I))
11 θt+1 ← θt − ηtg˜t
12 return θT , λ
F. Privacy Analysis
As we described in Section II-D, P3GM consumes privacy
budgets at three steps: PCA, EM-algorithm, and SGD, and we
introduced the differentially private methods independently. We
can simply compute the privacy budget for each component by
zCDP and MA, as described in the corresponding paper, and
we can adopt sequential composition for the three components
as the baseline.
Beyond this simple composition, we here follow RDP to
rigorously compute the composition, and meet the following
theorem.
Theorem 4: P3GM satisfies (ε, δ)-DP, for any 0 < δ < 1,
α > 1, such that:
ε ≤ 2αε2p + Tsεrs(α) + Teεre(α) +
log 1/δ
α− 1 . (9)
where εp is the parameter which decides the scale of the noise
for DP-PCA, εrs(α) = MADP-SGD(α− 1)/(α− 1), εre(α) =
MADP-EM(α− 1)/(α− 1), and, Ts and Te are the number of
iterations in DP-SGD and DP-EM, respectively. We refer to
Section II-D for the definition of MADP-SGD and MADP-EM.
Proof : We consider RDP for each component of P3GM.
First, as described at DP-PCA in Section II-D, DP-PCA satisfies
(α, 2αε2p)-RDP. Second, DP-SGD satisfies (α, εrs(α))-RDP in
each step from Theorem 3 and Inequality (4). Third, as in the
case of DP-SGD, DP-EM satisfies (α, εre(α))-RDP in each
step from Theorem 3 and Inequality (3). At last, from the
composition theorem (Theorem 1) in RDP, P3GM satisfies
(α, 2αε2p + Tsεrs(α) + Teεre(α))-RDP. By conversion from
RDP to DP from Theorem 2, we meet (9).
V. DISCUSSIONS
Here, we theoretically discuss why the AEVB algorithm
finds a better solution under differential privacy by adopting
the two-phased training than the end-to-end training of VAE.
A. Privacy Budget Consumption
Due to the privacy composition, increasing the number of
iterations to train a model also increases the amount of noise.
If we bound the total privacy consumption by ε, we require
to add more substantial noise in proportion to the number of
iterations. Conversely, to reduce the amount of noise, we need
a model and a learning algorithm that can converge in a small
number of iterations.
B. Solution Space Elimination
Here, we discuss the effect to the solution space by fixing
the mean of the encoder to some constant value µφ(x) = cx (In
this paper, we use f(x) as cx). If the encoder freezes the the
mean, it only searches variances to fit the posterior distribution
qφ(z|x) to the prior distribution pθ(z).
VAEs discover solutions by optimizing µφ(x), σφ(x), and
θ with minimizing the loss function:
LV AE(x) =−DKL(N (µφ(x), σφ(x))||pθ(z))
+
∫
N (z;µφ(x), σφ(x)) log pθ(x|z)dz.
Intuitively, the decoder learns to decode value around µφ(x),
which floats because of encoder’s simultaneous training. PGM
optimizes only σφ(x) and θ with an assumption that qφ(z|x)
is a Gaussian distribution whose mean is a constant cx. The
loss function of PGM is as follows:
LPGM (x) =−DKL(N (cx, σφ(x))||pθ(z))
+
∫
N (z; cx, σφ(x)) log pθ(x|z)dz
(10)
Assuming µφ(x), σφ(x), and θ be any values and pθ(z) of
VAE and PGM be the same, the range of all possible solutions
of VAE includes all possible solutions of PGM. Thus, the
search space of PGM is smaller than VAE. Intuitively, the
decoder only learns to decode values around cx.
Furthermore, assuming that σ(x) is a constant sx, we can
eliminate the search space. Its loss function is denoted by:
LAE(x) =−DKL(N (cx, sx))||pθ(z))
+
∫
N (z; cx, sx) log pθ(x|z)dz.
(11)
The first term becomes a constant, and this is identical to
autoencoder (AE) when we set sx = 0. Intuitively, the decoder
only learns to decode cx. The elimination of the search space
helps our model to discover solutions within a smaller number
of iterations. Our experiments in Section VI will demonstrate
this fact.
C. Quality of Solutions
In this paper, we fix µφ(x) = f(x) by the assumption of
Equation (6). The assumption is reasonable if pθ(z) (i.e., rλ(z))
is identical to pfθ∗(x). If pθ(z) does not approximate p
f
θ∗(x)
well, the above assumption is broken, which results in a worse
solution. Taking the example of P3GM, this occurs when pfθ∗(x)
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can not be assumed to be MoG, such as categorical data or data
including outliers. However, as experiments shown in Section
VI, P3GM performs well for such data. This is because that
P3GM learns the variance of the encoder qφ(z|x) in Decoding
Phase so that the KL term in (10) decreases. Training of the
decoder with the variance of the encoder compensates for some
failure in Encoding Phase. If we fix both mean and variance of
the encoder as (11) (i.e., AE-like model), the KL term does not
decrease below a certain level, which results in a worse solution.
Inversely, the AE-like model can converge faster than P3GM
due to the smaller solution space by freezing the variance.
The dimensionality reduction also might break the above
assumption. If dimension-reduced data is exceptionally far from
the original data, it will be hard for the decoder to reconstruct
the original data. Thus, we need to consider the proper way
of dimensionality reduction to bring out P3GM’s ability.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we report the results of the experimental
evaluation of P3GM. For evaluating our model, we design the
experiments to answer the following questions:
• How effective can the generated samples be used in data
mining tasks?
• How efficient in constructing a differentially private
model?
• How much privacy consumption can be reduced in the
privacy compositions?
To empirically validate the effectiveness of synthetic data
sampled from P3GM, we make the experiment with the same
setting of Jordon et al. [25]. First, we train P3GM using a real
training dataset and generate a dataset so that the label ratio is
the same as the real training dataset, as we described in Section
IV-E. Then, we train the multiple classifiers on the synthetic
data and evaluate the classifiers on the real test dataset. For
the evaluation of the binary classifiers, we use the area under
the receiver operating characteristics curve (AUROC) and area
under the precision recall curve (AUPRC). For the evaluation
of the multi-class classifier, we use classification accuracy.
Datasets. We use six real datasets as shown in Table III
to evaluate the performance of P3GM. Each dataset has the
following characteristic: Kaggle credit card fraud detection
dataset (Kaggle Credit) is very unbalanced data which contains
only 0.2% positive data. UCI ISOLET and UCI Epileptic
Seizure Recognition (ESR) dataset are higher-dimensional data
whose sample sizes are small against the dimension sizes. Adult
is a well known dataset to evaluate privacy preserving data
publishing, data mining, and data synthesis. Adult includes 15
attributes with binary class. MNIST and Fashion-MNIST are
datasets with 28× 28 gray-scale images and have a label form
10 classes. We use 90% of the datasets as training datasets and
the rest as test datasets.
Implementations of Generative Models. The encoder has
two FC layers of [d, 1000, d′] with ReLU as the activate
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult
4https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Epileptic+Seizure+Recognition
5https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/isolet
TABLE III: Datasets
Dataset N #feature #class %positive
Kaggle Credit [14] 284807 29 2 0.2
Adult 3 45222 15 2 24.1
UCI ISOLET 4 7797 617 2 19.2
UCI ESR 5 11500 179 2 20.0
MNIST 70000 784 10 -
Fashion-MNIST 70000 784 10 -
TABLE IV: Hyper-parameters for each dataset.
σs learning rate #epochs batch size
Kaggle Credit 1.83 0.001 10 2000
Adult 1.6 0.001 5 300
UCI ISOLET 3.5 0.001 7 300
UCI ESR 2.9 0.001 7 300
MNIST 1.42 0.001 10 240
Fashion MNIST 1.42 0.001 10 240
function. d is the dimensionality of data and d′ is the reduced
dimensionality. The decoder also has two FC layers with
[d′, 1000, d] with ReLU as the activate function. We show the
hyper-parameters used in DP-SGD for each dataset in Table IV.
For the Kaggle Credit dataset, we did not apply dimensionality
reduction because this dataset is originally low dimensionality.
For the other datasets, we did dimensionality reduction with
reduced dimensionality dp = 10 and εp = 0.1. We set σe as
ε = 1 holds, Te = 20 and the number of components of MoG
as dm = 3. We develop the above models by Python 3.6.9 and
PyTorch 1.4.0 [37].
Implementations of Classifiers. For table datasets, we
use four different classifiers, LogisticRegression, AdaBoost-
Classifier, GradientBoostingClassifier, and XgBoost from
Python libraries, scikit-learn 0.22.1, and xgboost 0.90. We
set the parameters of sklearn.GradientBoostingClassifier as
max features=”sqrt”, max depth=8, min samples leaf=50 and
min samples split=200. Other parameters are set to default.
For image datasets, we train a CNN for the classification tasks
using Softmax. The model has one Convolutional network with
28 kernels whose size is (3,3) and MaxPooling whose size is
(2,2) and two FC layers with [128, 10]. We use ReLU as the
activate function and apply dropout in FC layers.
Competitors. We compare P3GM with PrivBayes [45], DP-
GM [4], and DP-VAE.
A. Effectiveness in Data Mining Tasks
We evaluate how effective can the generated samples be
used in several data mining tasks. We also empirically evaluate
the trade-off between utility and the privacy protection level.
Against non-private models in table data. Here, we show
that P3GM with (1, 10−5)-DP does not cause much utility loss
than non-private models: PGM and VAE. Table V presents
the results on the Kaggle Credit dataset. As listed in Table V,
we utilized four different classifiers. Comparing PGM with
VAE, it is said that PGM has similar expression power as
VAE. Comparing P3GM with non-private methods, in spite
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TABLE V: Accuracy comparison with non-private models. PGM and P3GM show relatively close accuracy against VAE.
AUROC AUPRC
VAE PGM P3GM VAE PGM P3GM
Logistic Regression 0.9617 0.9454 0.9380 0.6542 0.6865 0.6530
AdaBoost [19] 0.9599 0.9330 0.9146 0.5737 0.6528 0.4574
GBM [20] 0.9619 0.9442 0.9221 0.6838 0.6734 0.5231
XgBoost [12] 0.9395 0.9321 0.9247 0.2745 0.6469 0.4824
TABLE VI: Performance comparison on four real datasets. Each score is the average AUROC or AUPRC over four classifiers
listed in Table V. P3GM outperforms other two differentially private models on three datasets.
Dataset AUROC AUPRCPrivBayes DP-GM P3GM original PrivBayes DP-GM P3GM original
Kaggle Credit 0.5520 0.8805 0.9232 0.9663 0.2503 0.3301 0.5208 0.8927
UCI ESR 0.5377 0.4911 0.8243 0.8698 0.4265 0.3311 0.7559 0.8098
Adult 0.8530 0.7806 0.8321 0.9119 0.6374 0.4502 0.5917 0.7844
UCI ISOLET 0.5100 0.4695 0.6855 0.9891 0.2099 0.1816 0.3287 0.9623
of the noise for DP, we can see that scores of P3GM do not
significantly decrease, which shows the tolerance to the noise.
Comparison with private models in table data. Next, we
perform comparative analysis for P3GM, PrivBayes, and DP-
GM with (1, 10−5)-DP on four real datasets. In Table VI, we
give the performance on each dataset averaged across these
four different classifiers as well as Table V. P3GM outperforms
the other two differentially private models on three datasets
in AUROC and AUPRC. However, there is much degradation
on the UCI ISOLET dataset. This is because the smaller data
size causes more noise for DP and the high dimensionality
makes it difficult to find a good solution in the small number
of iterations. On the Adult dataset, PrivBayes shows a little
better performance than P3GM due to the simpler model.
However, PrivBayes only performs well for datasets having
simple dependencies and a small number of features like the
Adult dataset. Regarding the high dimensional data, our method
is significantly better than PrivBayes.
Classification on image datasets. We perform comparative
analysis with DP-GM and PrivBayes on MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST, whose data is high-dimensional. In Table VII, we
give the classification accuracies of classifiers trained on
each synthetic data. P3GM results in much better results
than DP-GM and PrivBayes, which shows the robustness to
high-dimensional data. Moreover, P3GM shows around 6%
and 5% less accuracy than VAE on MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST, respectively, under (ε, δ)=(1, 10−5). The accuracies
are relatively close to VAEs even P3GM satisfied the differential
privacy. Back to Figure 2, we also displayed generated samples
from our model and competitors. As we can see, P3GM can
generate images that are visually closer to VAE while satisfying
differential privacy.
Varying privacy levels. Here, we measure our proposed
method’s performance when we vary the privacy protection
level ε. In Figure 4, we plot AUROC and AUPRC of classifiers
TABLE VII: Classification accuracies on image datasets.
Dataset VAE DP-GM PrivBayes P3GM
MNIST 0.8571 0.4973 0.0970 0.7946
Fashion-MNIST 0.7854 0.5200 0.0996 0.7311
trained using synthetic Kaggle Credit dataset generated by
P3GM, DP-GM and PrivBayes w.r.t. each ε with δ = 10−5.
PrivBayes does not show high scores even when ε is large,
which means that PrivBayes does not have enough capacity
to generate datasets whose dependencies of attributes are
complicated, such as Kaggle Credit. Also, as we can see,
although DP-GM rapidly degrades the scores as ε becomes
smaller, the ones of P3GM does not significantly decrease.
This result shows that P3GM is not significantly influenced by
the noise for satisfying DP.
Varying degree of dimensionality reduction. Here, we
empirically explain how the number of components of PCA
affects the performance of P3GM. Figure 5 shows the results
on the MNIST. As we can see, the number of components (dp)
affects performance. Too much high dimensionality makes (DP-
)EM algorithm ineffective due to the curse of dimensionality.
Too much small dimensionality lacks the expressive power
for embedding. From the result, dp = [10, 100] looks a good
solution with balancing the accuracy and the dimensionality
reduction on the MNIST dataset.
B. Learning Efficiency
Here, we measure the learning efficiency of the proposed
method. As discussed in Section V, we can interpret that our
model reduces the search space to accelerate the convergence
speed. We empirically demonstrate it in Figure 7. Here, let
P3GM (AE) denote P3GM with fixing σφ(x) = 0 as (11).
In Figure 7a and Figure 7b, our proposed method shows
faster converegence than naı¨ve method (DP-VAE) in the
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Fig. 7: P3GM demonstrates higher learning efficiency than DP-VAE. More simple model increases more learning efficiency.
reconstruction loss (the first term of (8)). For these two datasets,
P3GM met convergences at earlier epochs than DP-VAE. In
Figure 7b, the loss of DP-VAE is decreased gradually in the
long term but shows fluctuations in the short term. In contrast,
P3GM shows monotonic decreases in reconstruction loss. This
is due to the solution space elimination by freezing the encoder
in our model.
We plot the performance in each epoch to see the conver-
gence speed of the models in Figure 7c and Figure 7d, which
shows that the performance with the smaller search space also
converges faster. Figure 7c shows the classification accuracy
with MNIST dataset and Figure 7d shows the AUROC with the
Kaggle Credit dataset. In both results, P3GM (AE) converged
at the earliest iteration in those three methods. While at the
end of iterations, P3GM shows the best results, and P3GM
(AE) is the second-best. This is because the search space of
P3GM is larger than P3GM (AE), so it can find the better
solution. In a similar vein, VAE can find a better solution since
the search space of VAE is larger than P3GM, but it will cost
a non-acceptable privacy budget. P3GM balances the search
space size and the cost of the privacy budget.
C. Privacy Composition
In this paper, we introduced the composition of privacy loss
based on RDP. Here, we show that our composition method
more rigorously accountants each privacy budget than the
baseline. We use zCDP for DP-EM and MA for DP-SGD as
the baseline, which is proposed composition methods in the
corresponding papers.
Figure 6 shows the computed value of ε by each method,
varying the amount of noise for DP-SGD. We freeze the amount
of noise for MA. Our composition based on RDP results in
a smaller value of  than the baseline. Thus our method can
compute the privacy composition in a lean way.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper addressed the question, how can we release a
massive volume of sensitive data while mitigating privacy risks?
Particularly, to construct a differentially private deep generative
model for high dimensional data, we introduced a novel model,
P3GM. The proposed model P3GM hires an encoder-decoder
framework as well as VAE but employs a different algorithm
that introduces a two-phase process for training the model to
increase the robustness to the differential privacy constraint. We
also gave a theoretical analysis of how effectively our method
reduces complexity comparing with VAE. We further provided
an extensive experimental evaluation of the accuracy of the
synthetic datasets generated from P3GM. Our experiments
showed that data mining tasks using data generated by P3GM
are more accurate than existing techniques in many cases. The
experiments also demonstrated that P3GM generates samples
with less noise and more diversity than competitors. We believe
that our model can be useful in private data release for various
data mining tasks while preserving our privacy.
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